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in less competitive industries. This result confirms that of Harris (1998) who also finds managers are less likely to separately disclose operations in less competitive industries, using a sample of multi-segment firms and SFAS No. 14 data.
Managers with operations in less competitive industries may withhold segment information to protect profits, thereby mitigating the proprietary costs of disclosure. However, some allege that managers used the flexibility inherent in SFAS No. 14 to conceal poor performance. We conduct a variety of tests and find results consistent with firms using the flexibility afforded by SFAS No. 14 to mitigate proprietary costs and protect profits in less competitive industries rather than to conceal poor performance.
SFAS No. 131 is unique in that it is the first standard specifically targeted to addressing financial analysts' complaints. To investigate the impact of the new disclosures on analysts' information environment, we develop hypotheses concerning how the increase in public disclosure resulting from SFAS No. 131 might affect analysts' forecasts. We use the Barron et al. (1998) model that relates properties of analysts' information environments to properties of their forecasts to develop hypotheses and to estimate the effect of SFAS No. 131 on analysts' consensus, overall uncertainty, and squared error in the mean forecast.
We examine changes between 1997 and 1998 (the year before disclosure) and 1998 and 1999 (first year of disclosure) in analyst consensus, overall uncertainty, and squared error in the mean forecast. We rerun the analysis for a subset of firms with sufficient data through 2000 to determine if any observed changes are sustained in the near term. However, we lose one-fifth of our sample firms with I/B/E/S data when we move to the longer term, weakening the power of this analysis.
Coincident with the adoption of SFAS No. 131, we document a significant and sustained increase in consensus among the change firms' analysts. Since consensus captures analysts' relative reliance on public information versus the combined set of public and private information, an increase in consensus suggests increased reliance on public information. At the same time, we find some evidence of an increase in overall uncertainty among the change firms' analysts. These results suggest that analysts abandon a more costly, albeit more informative private information set, in favor of a less costly public information set. Reliance on this public information set increases consensus while abandoning the richer private information set increases uncertainty. However, when we rerun the uncertainty analysis for the subset of firms with data through 2000, we find no evidence of a change in overall uncertainty coincident with the adoption of SFAS No. 131. Accordingly, the latter result is sensitive to the set of firms examined.
In computing the mean forecast, the process of averaging across analysts' forecasts mitigates the impact of error in analysts' private information sets since this source of error is idiosyncratic. However, the process of averaging does not mitigate the impact of error in the analysts' public information set as this source of error is common to all analysts (Barron et al. 1998 ). As a result, it is possible for the magnitude of the error in the mean forecast to increase with increased reliance on public information. Coincident with the adoption of SFAS No. 131, we document a significant increase in the magnitude of the error in the mean forecast. However, when we rerun the analysis for the subset of firms with data through 2000, we find no evidence of a change in the magnitude of the error in the mean forecast coincident with the adoption of SFAS No. 131. Accordingly, this result is sensitive to the set of firms examined.
Section II provides a brief description of the evolution of SFAS No. 131 and outlines our research questions in the context of related research. Section III describes our empirical proxies, while Section IV lays out our sample selection procedures and provides descriptive (2000) disputes the severity of this problem, however. They find that more than 60 percent of their sample firms disclosed quarterly segment data on a voluntary basis prior to 1987. Thus, analysts' complaints may have stemmed from extremely poor disclosures by a minority of firms. Other improvements requested by users included (1) a greater number of segments for some enterprises, (2) more information about segments, (3) a segment breakdown that corresponds with internal management reports, and (4) consistency of segment information with information provided in other parts of the annual report. SFAS No. 131 was implemented to rectify these perceived inadequacies of SFAS No. 14. Specifically, SFAS No. 131 requires interim reporting of segment information. In addition, firms must identify industry segments for external reporting purposes in the same manner that management views operating segments for internal decision-making purposes. Also, firms are required to disclose information about each reportable segment that is similar to the information available to internal decision makers. Thus, firms may now choose their own definition of segment profit regardless of whether it is consistent with generally accepted accounting principles. As discussed below, this particular attribute of SFAS No. 131 complicates the analysis of segment-level profitability.
Related Literature
This paper examines managers' motives for withholding segment information under SFAS No. 14 and the impact of SFAS No. 131 disclosures on analysts' information environment. In this respect, it adds to a growing body of research that uses firms' segment reporting choices as a setting in which to address questions related to the costs and benefits of voluntary and mandatory disclosures. For example, Harris (1998) provides empirical evidence that competition affects managers' segment disclosure choices. Piotroski (1999) documents an association between voluntary increases in the number of reportable segments and capital market benefits. Finally, Botosan and Harris (2000) find that firms are more likely to voluntarily increase the frequency of their segment disclosures following declines in market liquidity and analyst consensus, presumably to mitigate increased information asymmetry among market participants. Each of these studies uses SFAS No. 14 data.
More The Hayes and Lundholm (1996) theory suggests that managers hide certain segments to protect profits. However, analysts and others complained that managers abused the latitude in SFAS No. 14 to conceal poor performance. Accordingly, we examine the following nondirectional hypothesis related to firm profit performance: proportion of total uncertainty that is common across analysts due to analysts' reliance on public information. This relationship is captured by Equation (2):
Finally, squared error in the mean forecast (SE) fully reflects common uncertainty, but reflects only a fraction of idiosyncratic uncertainty. This result obtains because the process of averaging across N analyst forecasts has no effect on common uncertainty, but because uncertainty arising from analysts' reliance on private information is idiosyncratic, the effect of this uncertainty is diversified away in the mean forecast. This relationship is captured by Equation ( 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL PROXIES Proprietary Costs
We provide evidence on managers' motives to withhold segment information under SFAS No. 14 by examining the competitive environment of the change firms' hidden segments. We define industry in terms of the three-digit SIC assigned by Compustat and we use four-firm concentration ratios to measure competitive environment in our primary tests. We compute four-firm concentration ratios by taking the ratio of the sum of sales for the four largest firms in an industry to total industry sales. Our computations incorporate all firms included on the Compustat PST, Full Coverage, and Research tapes. As the market share held by the four largest firms increases, competition decreases; thus, concentration ratios are inversely related to the level of competition.
In supplementary analysis we use the Herfindahl index and the Harris (1998) Speed of Profit Adjustment metric to measure competitive environment. We estimate the Herfindahl index by summing the squared market share of all firms in an industry. The Herfindahl index is similar to the four-firm concentration ratio in that as it increases competition decreases. However, the Herfindahl index includes all firms in an industry not just the largest four.
We estimate Harris' measure of the speed of positive abnormal profit adjustment with the following regression:
where:
X,,i = the difference between firm i's return on assets and the mean return on assets for its industry, j, in year t; D, = 1 if Xijt,_ is less than or equal to 0, and 0 otherwise; and D, = 1 if Xijj, is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise. Equation (4) is estimated separately for each three-digit SIC using pooled crosssectional time-series data for all firms in each industry. The coefficient p32 reflects the persistence of return on assets above the mean in industry j. A significant positive coefficient indicates that firms earning above average profit rates are able to maintain this profit advantage over time; suggesting less competition.
Concentration ratios and the speed of profit adjustment reflect different aspects of competition. Both the four-firm concentration ratio and Herfindahl index reflect market share competition among firms within a single year. The speed of profit adjustment reflects competition for abnormal profits over time, regardless of firm size. Note that this measure is capable of capturing competition among a few large firms in a concentrated industry while the concentration ratios are not.
For the 340 firms that report segments in industries that differ from their primary industries (i.e., firms with hidden segments), we aggregate concentration ratios across the firms' hidden segments by computing a weighted average concentration ratio using segment size (segment sales) as the weights. We compare the concentration ratio for the firms' primary industries to the segment-based ratio to determine whether the hidden segments 
Firm Performance
Under SFAS No. 131 firms are allowed to define segment profit for external reporting in terms of the internal amounts used by corporate executives to evaluate segment profitability. As a result, many different definitions of profit appear in firms' SFAS No. 131 disclosures and in many instances it is extremely difficult to identify the definition of profit employed by a firm in preparing its segment disclosures.3 Indeed, many of the concerns expressed by academics, regulators, and the business community in relation to "pro forma earnings" are equally applicable to the segment profit disclosures provided under SFAS No. 131. Moreover, many firms do not allocate selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses to their segments producing unrealistically high profit margins at the segment level.
The multitude of profit definitions employed by firms and the ensuing difficulty we had identifying each firm's profit definition, combined with the bias induced by firms' decisions not to allocate SG&A expenses to their segments, make it difficult for us to assess profitability using reported segment profits. Accordingly, we employ segment sales and industry profit margins in our profit analysis as described below.
We undertake several comparisons to provide evidence on firm performance in the final fiscal years of SFAS No. 14 (1996 and 1997) and first fiscal year of SFAS No. 131 (1998). First, we assess the change firms' profit performance relative to a set of single-segment firms matched by three-digit SIC code, which continue to report as single-segment firms following the adoption of SFAS No. 131. Hereafter we refer to these firms as "no-change" firms. This comparison is relevant, because the change firms pooled with the no-change firms prior to SFAS No. 131 by virtue of the change firms' decision to withhold industry segment information. The no-change firms tend to be substantially smaller than the change firms, however, raising the possibility that differences in firm size confound our results. To address this issue, our second comparison assesses each change firm's profit performance relative to a firm matched by three-digit SIC code and sales. While the match firms are similar to the change firms in terms of size, they are fundamentally different in that the match firms did not use the flexibility afforded by SFAS No. 14 to the same extent as the change firms, perhaps because the nature of their operations did not afford them the flexibility to do so. Since both comparisons bring different advantages and disadvantages to bear, we believe that both are incrementally informative.
We examine the profitability of the change firms at both the firm-level and segmentlevel. We begin by assessing firm performance at the firm-level using benchmark measures of industry performance that were observable by market participants in real time. These comparisons assess how the change firms' profitability differs from that of other firms operating in the change firms' primary industries. The "other" firms used in this analysis are either the no-change firms or the match firm, but regardless, we estimate expected firmlevel profit for the change firms by multiplying firm sales by an estimated industry net 2 For example, InfoUSA's firm SIC is 7374; under the new standard they report segments in SICs 7331 and 7374.
Thus, we compare the four-firm concentration ratio for the firm's primary industry, SIC 737, to the concentration ratio for SIC 733 (in this case, the weight is 1.0). 3 We identified the following six profit definitions for our sample firms: earnings before interest and tax (57 percent), earnings before tax (12 percent), net income (12 percent), gross profit (11 percent), earnings before interest taxes, depreciation and/or amortization (5 percent), and earnings before discontinued operations and/ or extraordinary items (3 percent). However, even these definitions were inconsistent across firms.
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Botosan and Stanford profit margin. For the analysis involving the no-change firms, our estimated industry net profit margin is the median net profit margin of the no-change firms, but for the analysis involving the match firm, we use the match firm's net profit margin. Finally, we estimate the change firms' unexpected profits, our test statistic, by taking the difference between the firms' reported and expected profits and scaling by their reported profits. These procedures produce two test statistics: one involving a comparison between the change and the median no-change firm, and the other involving a comparison between the change firms and their match firm. We also assess firm performance at the segment-level using benchmark measures of industry performance that were not observable by market participants in real time. Instead, these benchmark measures would have been observable only if the firm had provided segment disclosures. These comparisons assess how the change firms' profitability differs from that of other firms operating in the change firms' segments' industries. For purposes of this analysis we estimate expected segment-level profit for each of the change firms' segments by multiplying segment sales by the estimated industry net profit margin applicable to each segment. For purposes of the analysis involving the no-change firms, our estimated industry net profit margin is the median net profit margin of the no-change firms operating in the same three-digit SIC codes as the segments. For purposes of the analysis involving the match firm, our estimated industry net profit margin is the net profit margin of a match firm matched at the segment level on the basis of three-digit SIC code and sales.4 Finally, we sum the segment-level expected profits to arrive at firm-level expected profits and compute firm-level unexpected profits, our test statistic, by taking the difference between the firms' reported and expected profits and scaling by their reported profits. This procedure produces two additional test statistics, one involving the no-change firms and the other involving the match firms.
On the one hand, finding that the change firms are less profitable than their competitors using the observable, firm-level benchmark, but are more profitable using the unobservable, segment-level benchmark is consistent with firms using the flexibility in SFAS No. 14 to conceal segment details that could be used by competitors to the detriment of the firm. Such a conclusion is also supported if we find that the change firms are more profitable than their competitors using both the observable and unobservable benchmarks. On the other hand, finding that the change firms are more profitable than their competitors, using the observable firm-level benchmark, but are less profitable using the unobservable segmentlevel benchmark, is consistent with firms using the flexibility in SFAS No. 14 to conceal poor performance. Such a conclusion is also supported if we find that the change firms appear less profitable than their competition using both the observable and unobservable benchmarks. 
Consensus, Uncertainty, and Squared Error in the Mean
Using I/B/E/S one-quarter-ahead forecasts of quarterly earnings issued prior to each
quarterly earnings announcement, we compute consensus, overall uncertainty, and squared error in the mean forecasts for each quarter beginning with January 1, 1997 and ending on December 31, 2000. We retain only the most recent forecast for each analyst for each quarter. We average the quarterly values of consensus, overall uncertainty, and squared error in the mean forecast across the four quarters within each year to arrive at average estimates for each firm year.
IV. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTION Sample Selection
We begin our sample selection with the 5,114 firms reporting as single-segment firms in their 1996 annual report. We eliminate non-December year-end firms for consistency and to ease data collection because we hand-collect segment data for 1996 through 1998. Compustat does not report the 1996 and 1997 retroactive segment data the change firms disclosed in their 1998 financial statements. Accordingly, we hand-collect this segment data from the sample firms' 10-Ks and assign Compustat's 1998 segment SIC codes to the 1996 and 1997 retroactive segment data.
We examined footnote disclosures for each change firm to verify that SFAS No. 131 is the reason for initiating segment disclosure. We also compared the sum of our handcollected segment sales data to consolidated sales data reported on Compustat. Due to concerns about data quality, we eliminated 16 firms for which the difference between these sales figures exceeds 10 percent. Also excluded from our final sample are firms whose SIC code places them in the banking, insurance, or utility industries. We exclude these firms because their disclosure behavior may be influenced by regulatory requirements.
Our final sample consists of 615, December year-end, change firms for which a 1998 10-K could be located and for which all other necessary data were available. For comparison purposes, we also identified 1,945 December year-end, no-change firms that report as single-segment firms before and after SFAS No. 131 and 615 match firms matched to the sample firms based on three-digit SIC code and sales. Since our profitability analysis involves comparisons at the segment-level as well as the firm-level, we also identify match firms for the segments based on segment three-digit SIC code and segment sales summed across segments with the same three-digit SIC code.
The sample firms operate in a wide variety of industries. Based on the firms' primary two-digit SIC codes, the most populated industry for the change and no-change firms is 73, which is business services. SIC 73 comprises 18.05 percent of the change firms and 14.81 percent of the no-change firms. In all, 41 two-digit SIC codes are represented in our final sample of change firms. Thus, our results are unlikely to be driven by any particular industry.
Consistent 
Sample Description
Descriptive statistics for the year ended 1998 are reported in Table 1 . Panel A provides descriptive statistics pertaining to the number of segments reported by the change and match firms, and total sales and profit margin (earnings before extraordinary items/sales) for all three groups of firms. As shown, the mean (median) number of segments reported by firms forced to initiate segment disclosure with the adoption of SFAS No. 131 is 2.9 (3.0). By comparison, the number of segments reported by the match firms, most of which provided segment disclosures under SFAS No. 14, is slightly higher on average (3.2), but slightly lower at the median (2.0).
The median change firm has total sales of approximately $177 million in 1998. By construction, the median match firm's sales are close, albeit somewhat smaller, at $166 million. On a firm-by-firm basis (not tabled) the difference between the sales of each change firm and its match is approximately 3 percent of change firm sales at the mean, and 0.2 percent of change firm sales at the median. While these differences are statistically different from zero, economically the match on sales is quite close. In contrast, the no-change firm sample is comprised of relatively small firms. Median total sales of $55 million for the nochange sample is significantly less than the corresponding figure for the change firms.
Firm-level profit margin for the median change firms is 2.5 percent, whereas the corresponding figures for the match and no-change firms are 3.4 percent and 1.0 percent, respectively. A tail of observations with extremely negative profit margins characterizes all three samples. Due to the existence of these outlying observations our subsequent statistical analyses focus on tests of median values. Table 1 , Panel B describes the nature of the change firms' newly revealed segments. The mean (median) proportion of all newly disclosed segments operating in the same industry as the firm's primary industry is 72.98 percent (75.00 percent). This is consistent with the change firms claiming to operate in only one industry prior to SFAS No. 131. However, 340, or 55 percent, of the 615 change firms report segments in industries different from their firm's primary industry. Consistent with analysts' complaints, the mean (median) proportion of firm sales accounted for by these segments is 31.22 percent (23.45 percent). Since SFAS No. 14 required segment disclosure of operations that accounted for 10 percent or more of sales, assets, or profits, this evidence suggests these firms abused the "latitude" in the standard to avoid disclosure. Table 2 , Panel A suggests that the change firms' hidden segments operate in less competitive industries than their primary industries. For firms with hidden segments, n = 340, the mean (median) difference between the concentration ratio of the firms' primary industries and the weighted average concentration ratio of the hidden segments' industries is -0.006 (-0.012) with p-values of 0.67 (0.04). Since a smaller concentration ratio implies a more competitive environment, a negative value indicates that the firms' hidden segments operate in less competitive industries than the firms' primary industries. Although only significant at the median, the difference in firm and weighted average segment concentration ratios is negative for 56 percent of the firms indicating that for a majority of the firms their hidden segments operate in less competitive industries.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS Competitive Environment and Profit Performance
In supplementary analysis, not included in the tables, we examine two alternative measures of competitive environment: the Herfindahl ratio and the Harris (1998) Speed of Profit Adjustment (SPA) measure. The results obtained with the Herfindahl ratio are quite similar to those reported in the table. The change firms' hidden segments operate in less competitive industries than their firms' primary industries, but this result is significant only at the median (p-value 0.045). Stronger evidence consistent with H1 is documented with the SPA measure, however. Using this measure the hidden segments operate in less competitive industries than their firms' primary industries and this result is highly significant at both the mean and median (p-values of 0.0001 for both). Accordingly, based on the results of these three sets of analyses we conclude that firms withholding segment disclosures under SFAS No. 14 hid operations in less competitive industries, consistent with H1.
Panel B of Table 2 documents the results of our firm-level assessment of the profit performance of the change firms relative to the no-change and match firms. Recall that this benchmark would have been observable in real time. At the median, we find that the change firms' reported profits are significantly greater than the benchmark profits implied by the no-change firms' net profit margins, in all three years. However, we also find that the change firms' reported profits are significantly less at the median than the benchmark profits implied by the size and industry match firms' net profit margins, in all three years. Panel C of Table 2 documents the results of our segment-level assessment of profit performance. Recall, that for this analysis we compute a benchmark measure of expected profit that could have been computed only if the firms had provided segment disclosures. At the median, we find that the change firms' reported profits are significantly greater than the expected profits implied by the net profit margins of the no-change firms operating in same industries as the change firms' segments. In addition, we find no difference between the change firms' profits and the expected profits implied by the net profit margins of the match firms operating in the same industries as the change firms segments. Overall, the results in Table 2 pertaining to both the competitive environment analysis and the profitability analysis, reveal a consistent and compelling story. That is, the change firms were motivated to exploit the flexibility inherent in SFAS No. 14 to protect profits from competitors, not to hide poor performance from the capital market. These results are consistent with abnormal profits being more likely, on average, in less competitive industries, and managers of firms that earn excess profits facing higher proprietary disclosure costs. Table 3 We document a significant increase in analyst forecast consensus for the change firms coincident with SFAS No. 131. As expected, between 1997 and 1998 (the year prior to the onset of disclosure) the mean change in consensus is not statistically significant. However, between 1998 and 1999 (the initial year of disclosure) consensus increases 0.051 (p-value = 0.027) from 0.553 to 0.605. In contrast, changes in consensus are not statistically significant for either year for the no-change firms (see Panel B of Table 3 ), even with a 60 percent larger sample size. The t-tests comparing the two groups indicate that the increase in consensus experienced by the change firms is statistically greater than the change in consensus experienced by the no-change firms (p-value of 0.028). Using a reduced sample of firms with forecasts in all four years from 1997 to 2000, we show that the increase in analyst forecast consensus is sustained through 2000 (the year following initial disclosure). Specifically, this subsample experiences a significant increase in consensus from 1998 to 1999 (p-value of 0.026), but an insignificant change in consensus both the year prior to initial disclosure, and the year after. Since consensus captures the amount of common information relative to total information impounded in analysts' forecasts, this increase suggests greater reliance on public information, consistent with H3. Overall, these results indicate that analysts responded to the change in their information environment by increasing their reliance on the public information that became available under SFAS No. 131. Table 3 , Panels A and B document mixed results from our analysis of changes in overall uncertainty around the introduction of SFAS No. 131. Consistent with H4, the data indicate no change in overall uncertainty for the change firms between 1997 and 1998 (the pre-SFAS No. 131 period), but a marginally significant increase in overall uncertainty between 1998 and 1999 (p-value of 0.060). In contrast, the no-change firms experience a significant increase in overall uncertainty the year before initial disclosure of segment information by the change firms, but experience no significant change in overall uncertainty in the year of disclosure. At the same time, analysis of the smaller sample for which we have a longer time-series of data, indicates no significant change in the change firms analysts' mean overall uncertainty until 2000 (the second year of disclosure), but significant changes in the no-change firms analysts' mean overall uncertainty in each year. Accordingly, we conclude that there is evidence of a marginal increase in overall uncertainty coincident with the adoption of SFAS No. 131, but this result is sensitive to the subset of firms examined. Finally, Table 3 , Panels A and B present the results of our analysis of changes in the squared error in the mean forecast (SE) around the adoption of SFAS No. 131. These results are similar to those discussed above pertaining to overall uncertainty. For the change firms, we document no significant change in the SE prior to adoption of SFAS No. 131, but a significant increase in the SE coincident with SFAS No. 131 adoption (p-value of 0.043). In contrast, the no-change firms experienced an increase in the SE the year prior to the adoption of SFAS No. 131, but no change in the SE in the year of adoption. These results are consistent with H5. However, using the smaller sample for the longer time horizon, we find no significant change in the change firm analysts' SE until 2000, whereas the nochange firm analysts' experienced significant increases in SE the year before and the year after adoption. Accordingly, we conclude that there is evidence of an increase in squared error in the mean forecast coincident with the adoption of SFAS No. 131, but this result is sensitive to the subset of firms examined. for a sample of firms that previously reported as single-segment firms. We examine this set of firms because they likely had the strongest incentives to withhold segment information and analysts potentially had the most to gain when these firms were forced to begin providing segment disclosures under SFAS No. 131. Moreover, these firms epitomized analysts' complaints that some firms abused the latitude in SFAS No. 14 to avoid providing any segment disclosure. Thus, we believe this set of firms is well suited to the research questions we investigate.
Effect on Financial Analysts
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Our study provides varying degrees of support for both sides of the debate surrounding SFAS No. 131. First, our results suggest that the managers of firms forced to initiate segment disclosures under SFAS No. 131 withheld segment information under SFAS No. 14 to protect profits in less competitive industries, not to conceal poor performance as some have alleged. This supports managers' claims regarding the proprietary costs of segment disclosure and does not support analysts' claims that managers concealed poor performance. Second, the majority of the firms initiating segment disclosures under SFAS No. 131 (55 percent) report segment operations in industries distinct from their firm's primary industry. The mean (median) percent of firm sales accounted for by these operations is 31.2 percent (23.5 percent), which is far in excess of the SFAS No. 14 requirement to report any segment accounting for 10 percent or more of sales, assets, or profits. This supports analysts' claims that multi-segment firms masqueraded as single-segment firms under SFAS No. 14. At the same time, 45 percent of the change firms report segments, all of which have the same three-digit SIC code as the firm's primary industry. Thus, even though these change firms now report segment data, the data provided pertains to activities in a single-industry classification, providing limited cross-industry variation among the newly reported segments. Finally, our evidence suggests that while SFAS No. 131 encourages greater reliance on public information (presumably due to lower information acquisition costs), overall uncertainty and the magnitude of the error in the mean forecast also increased marginally for the change firms. These results suggest that the analysts' shift to greater reliance on public information came at a cost in terms of forecast accuracy. However, these results are sensitive to the set of firms examined.
